The trial courts are necessarily bound by the protocol before them. In terms of the interpretation and performance of contracts, the question of the extent to which the context of contract drafting is properly authorized is controversial.25×25. Compare Pac. Gas and Elec. Co. v. G. Thomas Drayage – Rigging Co., 442 p.2d 641 (Cal. 1968) (Traynor, C.J.), with Trident Ctr. v. Conn.

Gene. Life Ins. Co., 847 F.2d 564 (9. Cir. 1988) (famous dispute over the scope of the Parol rule of evidence). We agree with Kar and Radin that with respect to the nature of the contracts under discussion, it is appropriate for the court to take into account the context in which the textual text is presented and „accepted“; Our previous discussion on how to apply objective theory of interpretation also precedes. This means using documents, electronic images and testimonials that show how the text itself was produced. But if, instead, a court that followed Kar and Radin`s proposal was asked to use its imagination to guess whether a particular term could have been the result of a fictitious oral conversation in which „both sides followed the standards of cooperation that regulate the language [according to Grice],“26×26. Kar and Radin, supra note 1, at 1167 the court would hardly know. where it is to begin, much less the rule of law which empowers the Tribunal not to include in the minutes a decision on the basis of such imaginary facts.

While we agree with Kar and Radin that ignorance of a large amount of language is closer to reality than it is worthy, as if it were a negotiated text, we believe that the discovery of real common sense in a particular case must be based on facts in the record, and on reasonable conclusions. , rather than on a somewhat muddy exercise in the imagination. The conclusion seems to be, as Kar and Radin said: „The parties are of course always free to agree in advance to settle a wide range of disputes. But they cannot accept arbitration without doing so within the common meaning of the parties. 38×38. Id. to 1206. Which, of course, raises this question: if the presentation of a long-standing text in a routine operation and confidence in an unrealistic „reading obligation“ and a clicked „I agree“ violates the standards of cooperation and gives the objective observer no reason to believe that the text has been agreed, which is enough? Kar and Radin reasonably assert that the answer depends on the context and advise that „[d]against enduring those hoping to use boilerplate text to create common sense for the parties should therefore choose their battles with caution and find innovative ways to communicate in a cooperative manner the concepts most essential to their proposed contracts.“ 39×39. Id. to 1179. The example that Kar and Radin propose to make this generality a reality – discussing another form – gives the buyer a license, a two-option song (listen to a single platform or listen to multiple platforms) at explicit prices;40×40. See id. at 1178.

Just as common when renting a car and you have to choose between different insurance options. But if the underlying question is whether the parties share meaning in relation to what has been agreed, the offer of an election does not appear necessary; and a state statute or court decision that parties must be offered an election to accept or reject arbitration appears to be contrary to federal arbitration law, at least as the Supreme Court understands.41×41. In Doctor`s Associates, Inc. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681 (1996), Montana required that any contract providing for mandatory conciliation be marked in capital letters highlighted on the first page of the contract; This purely heuristic provision was also considered a violation of the law.